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Chapter 391 Monarch Power and Prime Minister Power(1/2)

Chapter 391 King’s Power and Prime Minister’s Power

Author: Wang Zixu

Chapter 391 King’s Power and Prime Minister’s Power

Emperor Zhu Jianyan of the Ming Dynasty stayed in the palace for a few days. Together with his father, the Supreme Emperor Zhu Zhongliang, they analyzed and discussed the direction of subsequent reforms based on Zhu Jingyuan's suggestions.

Although Zhu Jingyuan is special, Zhu Jingyuan's suggestions are still just suggestions, and the final decision must be made by Zhu Jianyan.

Many of Zhu Jingyuan's idealistic ideas were actually often suppressed by Zhu Jianyan and Zhu Zhongliang into practical plans.

For example, Zhu Jingyuan believes that the actual grade of Jiuqing can be given to the first rank first, or directly to the first rank, and it is recommended to directly give the first rank.

This is Zhu Jingyuan's habitual generosity, while Zhu Jianyan and Zhu Zhongliang are habitually "stingy".

Zhu Jianyan's natural choice was to first confer Jiuqing with the first rank of Cong, and then three or six years later, or even when he was ready to retire, he would be promoted to the first rank of "honorable retirement".

At the same time, as the people who knew the Ming Dynasty's political system best, Zhu Jianyan and Zhu Zhongliang considered more details.

For example, after establishing a large region and taking charge of Jiuqing, how to ensure that the actual status of the local provinces directly under the jurisdiction is higher than that of the large region?

If Jiu Qing is in charge of the central government offices of several imperial courts and is also the corresponding head of a large domain, will Jiu Qing be biased towards the large domain he is in charge of when dealing with daily affairs?

If no targeted adjustments are made, the affairs of the so-called provinces directly under the central government, after the Jiuqing in charge is established, will still be sent to the corresponding competent department, and then transferred to the Jiuqing in charge of the corresponding affairs.

Provinces directly under the central government need to contact all departments, and it is all Jiuqing who ultimately handles their own affairs.

On the other hand, the affairs of the large region that Jiuqing is in charge of are directly sent to the designated Jiuqing in charge through the six designated officials in charge of the governor, governor, punishment officer, and censor.

In this case, Zhu Jianyan felt that if it was Jiu Qing, even if he did not intentionally favor the region he was in charge of, he would definitely be more familiar with the officials in the region he was directly in charge of, and would have direct decision-making power on affairs without the need to go to them.

Others, of course, should prioritize these matters.

This will also allow the Jiuqing in charge to obtain the "right of prime minister" corresponding to the large domain.

Taizu Zhu Yuanzhang forbade the establishment of a prime minister, his original intention was to transfer the power of the prime minister into the hands of the emperor.

The essence of the prime minister's power is another "general decision-making power" outside the monarch and within the bureaucracy.

Decision-making power is important, but "general purpose" is even more important, which is the "core" of another bureaucracy.

The bureaucracy has its own core and can handle most things without the emperor.

Zhu Yuanzhang transferred the power of prime minister to the emperor, merged the general decision-making power of the entire court, and concentrated it all on the emperor.

Except for the emperor, no one individual in the imperial court had the power to make decisions on most government affairs.

All officials are only decision-makers under certain limited conditions, decision-makers within a category.

All the affairs of the entire country and the entire court have the ultimate goal of gathering together, with the emperor as the only core of the Ming Dynasty.

Prior to this, the imperial bureaucracy of China's traditional feudal dynasties usually had at least two decision-making cores.

At least there is a main core emperor, and one or more secondary cores are prime ministers.

The imperial court is missing a main core, or the main core is irresponsible. When other secondary cores operate, they can still maintain the basic integrity of the system and maintain the normal operation of the system.

But since Zhu Yuanzhang, the core of the central court bureaucracy has only been the emperor.

Without the core of the emperor, the system is directly divided into several parts, and normal interaction between them cannot be completed.

The court and bureaucracy would no longer be able to function normally, at least not legally and continuously.

Zhu Yuanzhang used a complete set of top-level structures to block the possibility of the emergence of a second core and truly pushed centralization to the limit.

Since Zhu Yuanzhang, there has never been a de facto powerful minister.

Even if the emperor is completely indifferent, it is an indispensable part of maintaining the operation of the court.

Even if the existing emperor is killed, another emperor must be established, otherwise the entire system will still not be able to function.

In the era before the Renwu Dynasty, there was a situation where the emperor's direct decree was called the "central decree" without being "voted and drafted" by the academicians, and it might not be implemented.

But this does not mean that the "Zhongzhi" is an illegal document in the modern sense.

The draft is not a necessary condition for the legality of the imperial decree. The imperial decree and the emperor's will are the law.

Officials who refuse to comply are actually resisting the order.

At that time, the great bachelors were equivalent to the representatives and leaders of the bureaucracy. Their refusal to vote showed that the bureaucracy did not support the emperor's decision.

This situation shows that the imperial power and the civil servant group did not reach an agreement, and the emperor wanted to forcefully promote what he wanted to do.

As the bureaucracy and civil servant groups continue to expand, the bureaucracy is resisting imperial power by refusing to execute.

Not voting is a signal sent by the leader of the bureaucracy to the outside world, which is equivalent to shouting to all officials:

"Everyone is not allowed to do what the emperor says. Whoever goes to do things for the emperor will be rewarded by you in the future!"

The reason why lower-level officials did not implement it was actually because they were worried about being squeezed out by the bureaucracy in the future, rather than saying that the imperial edict was illegal.

If the emperor has subordinates that he can fully control, and if the emperor's controller has the executive power to independently implement his own will, he will not care at all whether the imperial edict is drafted or not.

The process of Emperor Shizu coming to power was the process of re-establishing his own team, which also directly broke the so-called voting convention.

Zhu Jianyan, as the emperor, and Zhu Zhongliang, who had been the emperor, were both more sensitive to the power of the prime minister than the ministers.

So after realizing this problem, they made a decision quickly.

While establishing a central court in charge of the Nine Ministers, the decision-making scope of the Nine Ministers must be adjusted and clarified.

Jiuqing can still only be the decision-maker within a certain range, and is not the final decision-maker.

Zongbo is equivalent to the former Minister of Rites before the Renwu Dynasty, responsible for culture, etiquette, and education. Zhongzai is equivalent to the former Minister of the Ministry of Personnel, responsible for the construction of the bureaucracy. Sima is equivalent to the former Minister of War, responsible for the military budget, and military construction is placed in the Dudu Mansion.

.

Situ is in charge of finance and taxation, Sikong is in charge of industry and construction, Sikou is in charge of legal construction, etc.

In the end, the distribution was basically based on Zhu Zhongliang's ideas and the traditional responsibilities of the nine ministers.

At the same time, adjustments were made based on the actual situation, such as removing the civil affairs from Situ, who was in charge of finance, and assigning it to the Taicu.

At the same time, Jiuqing cannot be the true chief official of a large domain, and cannot have "general decision-making power" within the large domain he is in charge of.

Before the Renwu Dynasty and after Zhu Yuanzhang, although the general decision-making power of the central government office was completely obtained, local decision-making power was still often unified in the hands of the officials in charge.

Governors and governors are some form of local general decision-makers.

After the Renwu Dynasty, all local decision-making powers were separated again. The governors and governors, who had been basically fixed, gradually returned to the original mode of assigning special tasks and canceling them.

Independent judicial and supervisory agencies have also been established at both the prefecture and county levels, so that the prefect and county magistrates no longer dominate.

Now, of course, it is impossible to hand over the general decision-making power of a large domain to the nine ministers in charge.

Zhu Jianyan and Zhu Zhongliang were not even prepared to give the Jiuqing in charge direct decision-making power on any large-scale affairs.

The main duties of the Nine Ministers, which are also the official first duties, are determined to be the affairs of several central government offices to which they are assigned jurisdiction.

They would become members of the highest decision-making group of the central court under the emperor.

But he is not the chief official in charge of a large area.

The chief officials of a large region are still the governor, the protector, the criminal officials, and the censors. Most of the routine affairs in the local area should be directly decided by them locally, reducing the proportion of matters that the central court intervenes in.

Otherwise, the purpose of reducing the work pressure of the central government offices will not be achieved.

Among the remaining affairs that still need to be specially reported to the central court, most of the routine affairs still have to be handed over to the corresponding central government offices according to the procedures, and cannot be sent directly to the Jiuqing in charge.

After the establishment of the governor, protector, criminal officer, and censor of a large region, for various departments of the imperial court, it was equivalent to merging several or even dozens of provinces in this large region into a larger province.

The number of personnel that the corresponding department needs to contact has been directly reduced by an order of magnitude.

Although there are six chief officials in a large region, as the controller of the "universal decision-making power", if the emperor wants to directly manage a large region, he will of course be familiar with the situation of all fifty-four chief officials in all large regions.

However, each department of the imperial court has no general decision-making power and is only responsible for specific types of affairs.

The person they actually need to contact is only the corresponding one among the six chief officials of each region.

The Ministry of Revenue is responsible for civil affairs. It only needs to contact the governor in charge. Those who often deliver official documents must be the clerks under the governor. There is no need to care about who the governor is. It is impossible to know how many staff there are under the governor.

The Ministry of War is responsible for the military budget. It only needs to contact the governor and does not need to care who the governor is.

The Ministry of Punishment and the Metropolitan Procuratorate only need to contact the sentencing officer, and do not need to worry about government and military affairs.

For each department, the nine major areas mean nine more contacts, and the increase is completely acceptable.

On the other hand, the supervisors of Dadu are only in charge of a certain business, and there are still only a few departments that need to be contacted.

Therefore, there will be no problem if the affairs of the large area are sent directly to the department in charge.

After these matters reach the corresponding department, only those matters that require Jiu Qing's decision will be sent to the corresponding Jiu Qing.

Jiuqing is also in charge of several departments. They mainly deal with the ministers of only five or six departments, plus at most a dozen ministers, and a few clerical staff who often come to deliver documents.

They can also cope with it relatively easily.

Finally, only the special matters that Zhu Zhongliang and Zhu Jianyan specifically listed, that the emperor believed should and were necessary to be directly informed by the emperor, and that needed to be handed over directly for decision-making, could be sent directly to the emperor through the nine ministers in charge of the region.

The decision-making power of these affairs still remained in the hands of the emperor, rather than being left to the nine ministers in charge.

The Jiuqing in charge of the great domain was the bridge between the emperor and the great domain, and the intermediary between the emperor and the great domain.

There were too many officials in the large domain, so they went to the emperor directly, but the emperor couldn't handle them, so he asked Jiuqing, who was in charge of them, to act as a relay.
To be continued...
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